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effect 
Being able to judge—with some degree of accuracy— how your 
skills stack up against your peers or how good your chances are of 
winning in a competitive context is critical. If you underestimate 
your relative skills and develop an overly pessimistic outlook, you 
may forego wonderful opportunities because of a fear of failure, or 
you may waste time and resources overpreparing for competitive 
tasks for which you are already adequately prepared. If you over- 
estimate your skill and develop rosy expectations for success, you 
may pick unwise challenges or may fail to adequately prepare for 
a task and may eventually find yourself suffering a potentially 
avoidable defeat. 
Recent research suggests that when people are judging their 
comparative ability or estimating the likelihood of winning in a 
competitive task, they tend to be overly positive when the task is 
generally easy and overly negative when the task is generally hard 
(e.g., Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Endo, 2007; Larrick, 
Burson, & Soll, 2007; Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003; Moore 
& Small, 2007; Rose & Windschitl, 2008; Windschitl, Kruger, & 
Simms, 2003). One reason for this is egocentrism, which in the 
present context can be defined as a tendency for thoughts about the 
self and about self-relevant information to carry more weight in 
shaping comparative or likelihood judgments than do thoughts 
about  others  and  other-relevant  information  (see  Chambers  & 
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Windschitl, 2004). Indeed, Kruger (1999) found that when people 
estimate how good they are at a task relative to other people, they 
tend to think egocentrically; that is, they consider how skilled (or 
unskilled) they are at the task more so than how skilled (or 
unskilled) other people are at the task. Therefore, when a task is 
easy (e.g., operating a computer mouse), people judge their ability 
at the task to be better than average. However, when the task is 
difficult (e.g., sculpting human figures from clay), people judge 
their ability at the task to be worse than average. Windschitl et al. 
(2003) illustrated that this egocentrism also influences optimism 
(likelihood judgments) about the outcomes of competitions (see 
also Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008; 
Moore & Cain, 2007; Moore & Kim, 2003; Moore & Small, 2007; 
Rose & Windschitl, 2008). When participants believed they would 
play a fellow participant in a trivia competition, they tended to be 
overly optimistic if the relevant trivia category was easy (e.g., 
current events) and overly pessimistic if the category was difficult 
(e.g., baroque music). This tendency to be overoptimistic when 
shared circumstances are easy and overpessimistic when they are 
difficult is called the shared-circumstance effect (SCE; Windschitl 
et al., 2003). In support of the idea that egocentrism is involved in 
these SCEs, path analyses showed that participants’ likelihood 
judgments about winning were primarily a function of how much 
knowledge they thought they had about a category and not a 
function of how much knowledge they thought their competitor 
had. 
At first blush, this egocentrism seems problematic. Indeed, 
something must be amiss when both competitors in a pair are 
highly confident that they will beat each other on the easy trivia 
categories and will lose to each other on hard categories. Yet, there 
are different versions of egocentrism, and some versions are more 
defensible (perhaps rational) than others (Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004; Windschitl et al., 2003). One type of an egocentrism account 
 
 
characterizes egocentrism as a chronic attention bias—people are 
prone to attend to self-relevant information more than they attend 
to information about others, even when the latter information is 
equally valuable for making a good judgment. This type of ego- 
centrism does not appear to have an immediate, rational basis. 
However, another type of egocentrism account assumes that 
people tend to have more knowledge about themselves than 
about others and that any assessments they make of themselves 
would tend to be more reliable than assessments they make of 
others. As a general statistical principle, reliably measured 
variables tend to be better predictors of outcome variables than 
are unreliably measured variables. Likewise, it seems warranted 
to expect that more reliable self-estimates would be better 
predictors of true comparative standing or competition 
outcomes than would less reliable estimates of others. 
Therefore, when people need to make a comparative judgment, 
they have some justification for giving more weight to 
assessments about the self than to assessments about others 
(see Burson & Klayman, 2006; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Kruger et al., 2008; Moore & Cain, 2007; Moore & Small, 2007; 
Ross & Sicoly, 1979). 
Recent research by Kruger et al. (2008) demonstrated that when 
people are asked to predict which of two competitors will win a 
competition, people’s weighting of evidence regarding the 
competitors differs as a function of how much information they 
have about the competitor. For example, when participants 
imagined a high school acquaintance whom they knew quite 
well competing against an unfamiliar student in a trivia 
competition, participants predicted that the high school 
acquaintance would win the easy categories and would lose hard 
ones. Path analyses confirmed that participants primarily based 
their predictions on their judgments of how much their high 
school acquaintance knew about the categories and not on their 
judgments of how much the unfamiliar student knew. Hence, not 
only is there a reasonable rationale for people to weight self-
assessments more than other-assessments because of a difference 
in the amount of the information underlying the assessments (and 
therefore the reliability of those assessments) but also research 
lends support to the idea that assessments based on more rather 
than on less information do carry more weight in people’s 
comparative judgments– consistent with rational discounting. 
Yet, although the research by Kruger et al. (2008) is consistent 
with the notion that the weights people give to self-assessments 
and other-assessments are at least somewhat sensitive to informa- 
tion quality, the research did not address whether people give an 
optimal set of weights to self-assessments versus other- 
assessments, nor did the research address how the weights should 
shift under different conditions. Fully addressing these issues 
requires that researchers explicitly measure competition outcomes 
and judgment accuracy, which Kruger et al. (2008) did not do. 
Addressing these issues also requires a model that formalizes how 
self-assessments and other-assessments might be used in generat- 
ing likelihood judgments. Although egocentrism has been dis- 
cussed in numerous articles regarding optimism, comparative op- 
timism, and comparative judgment, we knew of no formalized 
models of egocentrism regarding these types of judgments (see 
e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Blanton, Axsom, McClive, & Price, 
2001; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Endo, 2008; Kruger, 1999; 
Moore & Small, 2007; Pahl & Eiser, 2007; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; 
Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982). 
We had four main goals for this project. The first goal involved 
bridging research on egocentrism in judging optimism with re- 
search concerning generic likelihood judgment. More specifically, 
we sought to apply an existing likelihood-judgment model to 
provide a formalized representation of how self-assessments and 
other-assessments are used when people estimate their likelihood 
of winning in a competitive situation. The second goal was to use 
this model and new judgment data to estimate the extent to which 
people tend to weight self-assessments and other-assessments in 
three competitions (one involving a trivia quiz and two involving 
a listing task). The third goal was to use the model, the new 
judgment data, and the new outcome data to estimate the extent to 
which people should have weighted self- and other-assessments in 
the competitions. Hence, whereas the second goal involved a 
descriptive analysis of judgments, the third goal involved a 
prescriptive analysis (i.e., how people could optimize the 
accuracy of their likelihood judgments). Finally, the fourth goal 
was to examine, within the context of the model and the three 
competitions, how attempts to de-bias egocentrism influence 
judgment processes and the resulting accuracy of people’s 
likelihood judgments. 
 
Goal 1: A Formalized Model of Egocentrism in Optimism 
As stated above, one main goal of this project was to apply an 
existing likelihood judgment model to provide a formalized 
representation of how self-assessments and other-assessments are 
used when people gauge their optimism about winning. We note 
that judging one’s likelihood of succeeding in a competitive con- 
text is simply a special case of a generic likelihood judgment. 
Significant modeling work has already been conducted regarding 
people’s generic likelihood judgments. Perhaps most prominent is 
the work on support theory (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tver- 
sky & Koehler, 1994; see also Brenner, Koehler, & Rottenstreich, 
2002). Our modeling of egocentrism involves an extension of 
support theory that was developed by Idson, Krantz, Osherson, and 
Bonini (2001). To simplify matters, when we discuss Idson et al.’s 
model, we focus only on binary cases (as opposed to polychoto- 
mous cases) in which there are only two possible outcomes or 
hypotheses (e.g., there are two competitors in a competition, 
exactly one of whom will win). 
Idson et al.’s (2001) extension of support theory was developed 
to better account for binary noncomplementarity (or 
nonadditivity). Previous research on binary noncomplementarity 
has illustrated that when people are aware that exactly one of 
two hypotheses (A and B) are correct, and when both 
hypotheses have low evidential support, the sum of the mean 
estimate from people asked to judge the probability of A and 
the mean estimate from people asked to judge the probability of B 
will often systematically fall below 1.0 (Macchi, Osherson, & 
Krantz, 1999; see also Fox & Levav, 2000; McKenzie, 1998; 
Windschitl, 2000; Yamagishi, 2002). For example, if people 
know that two terrible basketball teams will be playing against 
each other, the sum of the average probabilities regarding Team 
A and Team B winning may fall below 1.0. However, when 
the evidential support for the two hypotheses is strong, the 
relevant sum might systematically exceed 
1.0. These instances of noncomplementarity (and closely related 
findings, e.g., see Eiser, Pahl, & Prins, 2001; Klar & Giladi, 1997; 
Lehman, Krosnick, West, & Li, 1992; Moore & Kim, 2003; 
Windschitl, Conybeare, & Krizan, 2008; Windschitl et al., 2003) 
 
 
can be generally attributed to focalism: a tendency to base a 
probability judgment primarily on the evidence directly relevant to 
the focal hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis for which a probability 
estimate is sought) rather than the alternative hypothesis. There are 
actually several versions of focalism accounts (see Chambers & 
Windschitl, 2004), but each one ultimately stipulates that 
probability judgments will reflect assessments of evidence for the 
focal hypothesis more so than assessments of evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis. Idson et al.’s model was designed to 
represent the same pattern in a formal (mathematical) fashion. 
In doing so, it offers some insights, convenience, and precision 
beyond the ver- 
with s (A) read as support for A. The latter comparison, in which 
support for A is compared with K (the default or general standard), 
is represented as 
s(A) 
s(A) + K 
. (2)
 
A weighting parameter (i\; lambda) determines weight for the 
former versus the latter comparison in shaping the probability 
judgment. Hence, the full model for the judged probability of A 
rather than B is then represented as 
bally articulated focalism accounts. In this article, we apply Idson 
et al.’s model for representing egocentrism as well as focalism. 
A key point behind Idson et al.’s (2001) model is that if a judge 
  
 
reflects primarily on the evidence regarding the focal hypothesis 
(and neglects the evidence regarding the alternative hypotheses), 
the evidence regarding the focal hypothesis must be compared 
with something in order for the evidence to seem strong or weak. 
In their mathematical model, Idson et al. referred to the something 
as the constant K. Idson et al. (2001, p. 229) stated, 
 
Possibly, K may be interpreted as a default value of contrary evidence 
strength, subject to influence by context and frame, or it may simply 
be a normalization constant used to convert the open-ended evidence 
scale into a probability scale. 
 
Consider a case in which a judge is given some pregame statistics 
for two terrible basketball teams and is asked to estimate the 
likelihood that Team A will win. If the judge exhibits heavy 
focalism, he or she would compare the Team A statistics with 
some internal or default standard for basketball statistics (K), 
would thereby judge the Team A statistics to be weak, and would 
then make this the primary basis for his or her probability 
judgment. Additional perspectives as to what constitutes or 
shapes K can be gleaned from other literatures. For example, a 
perspective shaped by norm theory might suggest that K is a 
norm computed from representations that are evoked by a 
particular stimulus and by category exemplars or preexisting 
frames of reference (Kahne- man & Miller; 1986). Also relevant 
would be the work of Giladi and Klar (2002). They posited that 
when people make direct comparison judgments, they often 
compare items with a very general standard that is based on 
stored exemplars from the item’s category— even when doing so 
is not appropriate. We discuss the Giladi and Klar approach and 
its similarity to Idson et al.’s model later in the article. For the 
remainder of the article, we adopt a conceptualization of K as a 
default value or general internal standard. 
We henceforth refer to Idson et al.’s (2001) model and our 
application of it as extended support theory (EST), as coined by 
Idson et al. Rather than describe their model in its original 
terminology, we slightly adapt the terminology and use notations 
more suitable for the present article. The EST model assumes 
that the estimated probability of a focal hypothesis in a binary 
case (call it A, with the alternative being B) is a function of two 
things: (a) how the perceived evidence or support for A compares 
with the support for B and (b) how the support for A compares 
with K. The former comparison is represented as 
  s(A)   
s(A) + s(B) 
, (1)
 
 
 
From a prescriptive perspective, it would seem that i\ should be 
1.0. That is, people should base their probability judgment on how 
the support for the focal hypothesis (A) compares with the support 
for the alternative (B), not whether the support for the focal 
hypothesis is high or low in general terms (i.e., high or low relative 
to the default, K). However, consistent with the above discussion, 
research on focalism suggests that from a descriptive perspective, 
i\ is often less than 1.0 and that people’s probability judgments are 
in part determined by how the support for the focal hypothesis 
compares with some general default. Continuing with the basket- 
ball team example, when judging the probability that a terrible 
basketball team will beat an equally terrible team, people would 
often estimate lower than .5 because the support for the focal 
basketball team is low in general (i.e., relative to the general or 
default standard). 
Now that we have explained how EST can be useful for repre- 
senting focalism, it is not difficult to extend it to egocentrism (see 
Brenner et al., 2002). Assume a binary case in which a person is 
estimating the probability that he or she will win a competition 
against another individual. With this case in mind, egocentrism 
would—from a traditional perspective— be defined as a tendency 
for self-assessments (about strength or support or performance) to 
have greater weight than do other-assessments in predicting 
people’s probability judgments. However, previous discussions of 
egocentrism have not established a formalized representation of 
this egocentrism. Our application of EST formalizes how self- and 
other-assessments might relate to probability judgment in an ego- 
centric fashion and how such patterns would relate to SCEs. 
Namely, for people exhibiting egocentrism (or focalism, or both), 
i\ is less than 1.0, and their optimism about winning is partly a 
function of whether their self-assessed strength, support, or 
performance is generally high or low relative to a global or 
default standard, K. If the self-assessment is higher than the 
global standard (e.g., because all participants in a competition 
estimate their performance on an easy category to be generally 
high), these people would tend to be overoptimistic. If the self-
assessment is lower than the global standard, these people 
would tend to be over-pessimistic. 
It is important to reiterate that various egocentrism accounts 
have been proposed, and each describes a different set of processes 
that result in egocentric weighting (see Chambers & Windschitl, 
2004). As examples, one account characterizes egocentric 
weighting as the result of an attention bias; another, as a result of 
differential confidence about self-relevant and other-relevant in- 
formation; and another, as a result of egocentric anchoring and 
 
 
 
insufficient adjustment. EST does not directly sort among these 
egocentrism subaccounts. Yet, EST provides various conceptual 
insights into egocentrism, and as discussed in the next two 
sections, EST provides a useful analytic framework for examining 
the descriptive and prescriptive roles of egocentrism (and 
focalism) across various contexts. 
 
Goal 2: The Descriptive Role of Egocentrism 
The second goal for this project was to use the EST model and 
the judgment data to estimate— descriptively—the extent to which 
people tend to weight self- and other-assessments in three 
competitions. The three competitions (Studies 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively) are similar in structure. In all studies, each 
participant was pitted against a fellow participant. In Study 1, 
the participants individually completed a trivia quiz for each of 
eight trivia categories that ranged from generally hard to easy. In 
Studies 2 and 3, participants completed a time-limited listing task 
for each of 14 categories that also ranged from generally hard to 
easy. All participants provided estimates of the likelihood that 
they would beat their competitor on each category, as well as 
estimates of the number of items they and their competitor 
answered or listed correctly for each category (i.e., score 
estimates). An instructional manipulation (standard or debias) 
that was used in the experiments is described later. 
For each participant in the studies, we determined his or her 
descriptive level of egocentrism.1 Specifically, using EST 
(Equation 3 from above), we solved for i\. Self- and other-
score estimates were used for s(A) and s(B), respectively (see 
discussion by Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997, p. 296). 
Consistent with conclusions from previous work (e.g., Rose & 
Windschitl, 2008; Windschitl et al., 2003), we expected there to 
be robust egocentrism. Thus, we expected values of i\ to be 
substantially below 1.0. If the value of i\ estimated from a person’s 
data was 1.0, this would mean that the person’s probability 
estimates were strictly a func- 
Because the actual outcomes of the competitions are necessarily 
determined by both the scores from the self and the scores from the 
other person, it might seem that 1.0 would be the prescriptive value 
of i\, reflecting no egocentrism. However, consistent with our 
earlier discussion, if other score estimates are much noisier and 
less reliable than are self-score estimates then perhaps a person 
should discount the importance of their prediction about the other 
person’s score. In other words, perhaps prescriptive i\ would be 
substantially less than 1.0.2 
Continuing with this logic, the optimal or prescriptive weighting 
for score predictions about the self and the other should vary 
across competitions. In some types of competitions, a person might 
have very limited insight into their competitor’s performance (e.g., 
when their competitor is a stranger and the task is novel). Their 
only method of generating a score prediction for the other person 
might be through projection (see e.g., Dawes & Mulford, 1996; 
Hoch, 1987; see also Karniol, 2003; Krueger, 2003; Krueger & 
Clement, 1994; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Sherman, Presson, 
& Chassin, 1984). Although this method might be sensible, it is not 
insightful as to how the competitor will score relative to the self. 
In other types of competitions, a person might have much better 
insight into their competitor’s performance (e.g., when they know 
the competitor and something about the competitor’s suitability for 
the given task). In this latter case (but not the former), it may be 
optimal for score predictions about the other person to have as 
much influence as score predictions about the self (i\ should be 
near 1.0). 
We assumed that the participants in Study 1 (who were 
strangers) would be unlikely to have much insight into their 
competitor’s unique strengths and weaknesses at the trivia 
categories in the competition. For reasons described later, we 
expected participants’ knowledge of their competitors to be better 
in Study 2 and best in 
tion of how the score predictions about the self differed from the    
score predictions about the other person (i.e., no egocentrism). 
However, if i\ was 0, this would mean that the person’s probability 
estimates were strictly a function of how the score predictions 
about the self differed from some default or general expectation 
(i.e., pure egocentrism). Again, we expected there to be robust 
egocentrism, with i\s substantially below 1.0. This egocentrism 
should also lead to overoptimism about easy tasks in the compe- 
tition but to overpessimism about hard tasks in the competition, 
which would yield an SCE. 
 
Goal 3: The Prescriptive Role of Egocentrism 
Our third goal was to use the model, the judgment data, and the 
outcome data to estimate—prescriptively—the extent to which 
people should have weighted self- and other-assessments. In other 
words, we investigated the optimal level of egocentrism for 
achieving maximal accuracy in likelihood judgments about win- 
ning. Using Equation 3 and using a given participant’s self and 
other score estimates, we solved for the value of i\ that produced 
likelihood estimates that were maximally correlated with actual 
wins and loses. Henceforth, we often use the term prescriptive i\ to 
refer to this optimal value of i\, whereas we use the term descrip- 
tive i\ when referring to the value of i\ discussed in the above 
paragraph. 
1 Because we were examining people’s likelihood judgments about 
themselves winning a competition, differential weighting that was detected 
was consistent with both egocentrism and focalism. That is, egocentrism 
and focalism are indistinguishable when the self is part of the focal 
outcome. Previous research that has manipulated whether the self is part of 
the focal outcome has shown that egocentrism—apart from focalism—is a 
substantial contributor to SCEs (Windschitl et al., 2003). For convenience, 
then, we use the term egocentrism when referring to data patterns reflecting 
more weight for self-assessments than other-assessments, even though 
focalism might contribute to such patterns. 
2 The argument that people may be rational in discounting (or giving less 
weight to) their estimates of the competitor’s score presumes that people 
have not already substantially regressed their estimate of their competitor’s 
score. That is, if participants tend to report regressive estimates about their 
competitor (i.e., estimates that do not differ much from a baseline), this 
would suggest their score estimates might already reflect the relative 
unreliability of information about others. Hence, differential weighting of 
score estimates about the self and competitor would not be necessary. 
However, as we report later, although there is some evidence that partic- 
ipants’ score estimates regarding others were more regressive than their 
score estimates about the self, the magnitude of this effect was not 
sufficient to rule out the potential rational benefits of differential weight- 
ing. In short, a more complete statement of the rationality argument would 
be as follows: Given that people do not always fully regress their scores 
estimates for others, it may be rational for people to differentially weight 
self and other scores when making likelihood judgments. 
 
 
Study 3. Hence, we expected that the optimal value of i\ would be 
lowest in Study 1 and highest in Study 3. 
Also, we can determine whether people were more or less 
egocentric than they should have been, based on a comparison of 
the prescriptive and descriptive i\s. Although we expected that 
people should prescriptively be somewhat egocentric in making 
their likelihood judgments, we also expected that their descriptive 
level of egocentrism would actually exceed what would be 
prescriptively warranted. This is because egocentrism is a 
weighting bias that is multiply determined. Although rational 
discounting might underlie some of the egocentrism of our 
participants, we also suspected that nonrational causes, such as 
an egocentric and/or focalistic attentional bias, would augment 
the differential weighting they exhibited. 
Before moving on to Goal 4, we should note that the issue of 
whether egocentrism is warranted for achieving accuracy in 
likelihood judgments is somewhat parallel to the issue that has 
previously been addressed regarding false consensus—namely, 
the possibility that projection is helpful rather than problematic 
when a person is estimating the responses or characteristics of 
others (Davis, Hoch, & Ragsdale, 1986; Dawes & Mulford, 1996; 
Hoch, 1987, 1988; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Krueger & Zeiger, 
1993). We more fully discuss the somewhat parallel nature of 
these issues in the General Discussion section, but it is important 
to emphasize here that the issues are distinct from each other. 
Whereas Davis et al., (1986), Hoch (1987, 1988), Dawes and 
Milford (1996), and Krueger (Krueger & Clement, 1994; 
Krueger & Zeiger, 1993) essentially focused on whether a 
person should use self-estimates as a basis for estimating 
others, our research focuses on how a person should use self-
estimates and other-estimates to predict competition outcomes. 
 
Goal 4: Do Debias Instructions Help, Hurt, or Have No 
Impact on Accuracy? 
If, as we have suggested, people have rational reasons for some 
egocentrism but tend to overdo the egocentrism for nonrational 
reasons (e.g., an attention bias), could people benefit from some 
debias instructions? That is, if people were reminded to consider 
both the self and the other score predictions when making a 
likelihood judgment, would this “clean out” the irrational elements 
of egocentrism, leaving an optimal (or at least more accurate) set 
of judgments? 
Here it is important to distinguish between two types of 
accuracy or inaccuracy (see e.g., Epley & Dunning, 2006; 
González- Vallejo & Bonham, 2007; Yates, 1990, 1994). First, 
there is mean-level inaccuracy, which is related to the issue of 
calibration in the overconfidence literature. The SCE is an 
illustration of mean-level inaccuracy in the sense that people are 
generally over- optimistic about easy categories and 
underoptimistic about hard ones. A second type of accuracy or 
inaccuracy concerns whether people tend to actually win the 
tasks for which they have given high probability estimates and 
lose the tasks for which they have given low probability 
estimates (related to discrimination accuracy; measured in this 
article by a correlation between likelihood estimates and actual 
win–loss outcomes). A critical point is that these two types of 
accuracy are not necessarily influenced by the same factors—
they are semi-independent. 
We expected that debias instructions would always have a 
positive influence on mean-level accuracy or calibration. More 
specifically, we expected that participants who read debias 
instructions would show significantly reduced SCEs. This is 
because egocentrism of any type—regardless of whether it is 
rational or irrational—will tend to produce SCEs. However, we 
did not expect that debias instructions would necessarily have a 
positive influence on discrimination accuracy (the within-
participant correlations be- tween optimism and win–loss 
outcomes across categories). For this to occur, people would 
need to remove just the right amount of egocentrism. That is, 
they would need to remove the egocentrism due to nonrational 
causes but not the egocentrism (or its amount) that is 
rationally justified. Given the many hurdles that there are to 
decontaminating a bias (see e.g., Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 
1980; Larrick, 2004; Wegener & Petty, 1997; Weinstein & 
Klein, 1995; Wilson & Brekke, 1994), we expected that people 
would be rather coarse in adjusting their egocentrism in response 
to debias instructions. Hence, we expected that even if or when 
debiasing improved mean-level accuracy, it would not improve 
discrimination accuracy. 
 
Summary of Goals 
Briefly summarized, our goals for the article were to (a) apply 
a generic likelihood judgment model in order to provide a formal- 
ized representation of how self-assessments and other-assessments 
influence optimism in competitions, (b) use the model and 
judgment data to investigate descriptive weighting, (c) use the 
model, judgment data, and outcome data to investigate 
prescriptive weighting, and (d) examine how debias instructions 
influence various forms of accuracy. 
 
Overview of the Competitions: Studies 1–3 
We pursued these goals within three competitive environments: 
Studies 1, 2, and 3. Whereas Study 1 involved trivia quizzes, 
Studies 2 and 3 involved listing tasks. All the studies and their 
competitions were similar in structure and involved the same types 
of variables. This similarity in structure and variables allows us to 
make some informative comparisons across studies. The method- 
ology and results for the three studies are described together when 
possible. 
All studies involved one-on-one competitions in which 
participants individually completed competitive tasks involving 
categories that ranged from hard to easy. At this point, there- 
fore, participants had direct experience with the tasks but did 
not know how their competitor had done (nor did they know 
their own precise scores). After performing the tasks, 
participants provided likelihood judgments about winning each 
cate- gory, and they estimated the self and other scores for each 
category (i.e., score estimates). The studies also contained an 
instruction manipulation (standard or debias) that varied on a 
between-subjects basis. 
A key difference among the studies was the extent to which 
participants had a valid sense of their competitive advantage or 
disadvantage for each category. For the trivia categories in 
Study 1, participants did not have a good sense of their 
competitive advantage or disadvantage. For Studies 2 and 3, 
which were run concurrently, we chose a listing task 
involving cate- 
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Figure 1.    A schematic for the ordering of the main procedural elements of Studies 1–3. 
 
 
gories for which participant would naturally have a better sense 
of their competitive advantage or disadvantage. In fact, in Study 
3, an activity prior to the competition gave participants 
additional insight about their competitive advantage or 
disadvantage for each category. 
Before describing specific procedures for the studies, a word 
is in order regarding our debiasing instructions, which  may 
seem heavy handed to the reader. Indeed, we intended for our 
debias instructions and procedures to be strong, if not heavy 
handed. Our interest was not in whether modest instructions 
could effectively debias SCEs. Instead, our reason for including 
a debias condition was to see how participants’ active attempts 
to avoid egocentrism (prompted by our instructions and 
procedures) would influence various forms of accuracy. 
Metaphorically, we led our horse to water because we 
wanted to learn what would happen at the water. 
 
Method for Studies 1–3 
Participants for Studies 1–3 
The participants (Ns = 56, 58, and 60 for Studies 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively) were University of Iowa students fulfilling a research 
exposure component of their elementary psychology course.3 
 
Procedure and Measures for Study 1 
Figure 1 contains a schematic for the ordering of the key 
procedural elements of Study 1 (as well as Studies 2 and 3). 
Two  participants  (strangers)  arrived  for  each  session.  Upon 
arrival, they learned that they were about to compete in a trivia 
contest against their co-participant and that depending on their 
performance, a small amount of money could be earned. 
Immediately after this, participants individually answered 
seven multiple-choice questions and one tiebreaker question 
in each of eight trivia categories. Four of the quiz categories 
were designed to seem hard for our participants (e.g., South 
American geography, world’s rivers) and four were designed to 
seem easy (e.g., pop culture, fast food chains; see Windschitl 
et al., 2003). The subsequent set of procedures differed 
between standard and debias conditions. 
Standard condition for Study 1. Participants in the standard 
condition estimated the likelihood that they would beat their 
competitor in each of the eight categories (“Please indicate what 
you think your chances are of winning each category. Please 
give a numeric likelihood estimate between 0 and 100%.”). 
Instructions made it clear that there would be only one winner 
per category, with tiebreakers used when needed. Participants 
then provided score estimates for themselves and their 
competitor for each category (e.g., “I answered        [write in 0 –
7] items correctly for the Pop Culture category”). The order in 
which they made the eight 
 
 
 
 
3 In  some  analyses  reported  in  this  article,  the  actual  n  is  1  or  2  
participants smaller than reported here. This occurred when, for example, 
a participant failed to respond to a relevant question or provided estimates 
of zero for both the self and the competitor for multiple categories. 
 
 
score estimates for the self and the eight estimates for the 
competitor was counterbalanced.4 
Debias condition for Study 1. To encourage participants in the 
debias condition to see that both the score estimates about them- 
selves and their competitor were important for their optimism 
about winning, we had these participants answer the score-estimate 
questions before providing likelihood judgments. Also, just prior 
to making the likelihood judgments, participants read very strongly 
worded debias instructions—telling them that most participants 
tend to neglect the strengths and weaknesses of their competitor 
when gauging optimism, and urging them to avoid this tendency 
(see Appendix). 
 
Procedure and Measures for Studies 2 and 3 
Studies 2 and 3 were run concurrently and could be considered 
two between-subjects conditions from the same study. However, 
for clarity in exposition, we refer to them as Study 2 and Study 3. 
For these studies, we constructed listing tasks involving categories 
for which participants would have a better sense (relative to the 
categories  in  Study  1)  of  whether  they  were  at  a  competitive 
advantage or disadvantage compared with their coparticipant (a 
stranger). Our intuition about our selected categories was verified 
by informal pilot testing and by results reported later in this article. 
The only difference between the method for Study 2 and the 
method for Study 3 involves a prologue to the actual competition. 
In the prologue, participants answered two questions about each of 
14 categories (the same categories that would later be critical for 
the actual competition). First, they indicated how good they would 
be at listing items from a specified category (e.g., the planets in our 
solar system) within a “short period of time” (1 = not very good, 
5 = very good). Second, they provided a brief reason why they 
believed they would be good or not good at listing such items. The 
only difference between Study 2 and Study 3 was that in Study 2, 
participants answered these prologue questions privately and on 
paper; in Study 3, participants answered these questions publicly 
and orally, such that their coparticipant heard each answer. Hence, 
we intended these publicly stated answers to provide participants 
in Study 3 with additional insight about their competitive advan- 
tage or disadvantage in the actual competition that followed. 
After the prologue, all participants learned that they were about 
to compete in a series of listing contests against their coparticipant 
and that depending on their performance, a small amount of money 
could be earned. For these listing contests, we selected 14 catego- 
order in which they made these 14 self-estimates and 14 
competitor estimates was counterbalanced (as in Study 1). 
Debias condition for Studies 2 and 3. As in Study 1, 
participants in the debias condition answered the score-estimate 
questions before providing likelihood judgments. Also, just 
prior to making likelihood judgments, participants read the 
same type of debias instructions as were used in Study 1. 
 
Results Not Involving the Model 
Rather than reporting the findings of each study in separate 
sections, we report the findings from each study within the same 
subsections (organized by analysis or issue). This allows for useful 
comparisons across studies.5 We begin by focusing on analyses 
that do not directly involve the EST model. Before proceeding, we 
should note that many analyses involve an idiographic-statistical 
approach in which a within-subject correlation is computed for 
each participant across categories, and the resulting correlations 
(after transformation) are then treated as data points in t tests. For 
all such analyses reported below, Fischer r-to-z transformations 
were used (e.g., see Howell, 1982). 
 
Preliminary Analyses Regarding Insights About 
Competitive Advantage or Disadvantage 
A preliminary analysis confirmed our assumption that 
participants had a better sense of their comparative advantage or 
disadvantage in Study 2 than in Study 1, and in Study 3 than in 
Study 
2. For each participant, we took the differences between the 
estimated scores for self and others (per category) and correlated 
those with the differences in actual self and other scores. The mean 
correlation from Study 1 was significantly different from zero (r = 
.16; p < .01) but small in magnitude, suggesting that participants 
in Study 1 had only minimal insight about whether they had a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage for specific categories. The 
respective mean for Study 2 was significantly higher (r = .49), 
t(111) = 5.19, p < .001 (for comparison of Studies 1 and 2), and 
it was still significantly higher for Study 3 (r = .69), t(112) = 
4.14, p < .001 (for comparison of Studies 2 and 3). 
 
SCEs and the Influence of Debias Instructions 
To test for SCEs, we first gave each category an easiness score 
based on pretested participants’ beliefs about how many items they 
ries (from a pretested pool) that ranged from generally difficult    
(e.g., tool brands) to generally easy (e.g., planets). The order in 
which participants encountered the categories in the listing task 
was random. For each of 14 categories, participants were given 
30 s to individually list (on paper) as many items from that 
category as possible. The subsequent set of procedures differed 
between the standard condition and the debias condition (see 
Figure 1). 
Standard condition for Studies 2 and 3. Participants in the 
standard condition estimated the likelihood that they would beat 
their competitor in each of the 14 categories (0 –100%). 
Instructions made it clear that there would be only one winner per 
category, with specified tiebreakers used when needed. 
Participants then provided score estimates (i.e., number of 
correct items listed) for themselves and their competitor for each 
category. The 
4 In all of our experiments, participants also placed $0.25 bets on 
categories of their choice (exactly half of the categories they played) after 
having made their set of likelihood judgments. They doubled their money 
if they had, in fact, won a selected category. The bets were not a main 
component of project; for the sake of brevity, the betting procedures and 
results will not be detailed in this article. However, we briefly note that the 
betting results generally paralleled those of likelihood judgments (although 
they were less sensitive to the instructional manipulation). Please contact 
Paul D. Windschitl for further information. 
5 Comparisons between Study 1 and either Study 2 or Study 3 must be 
interpreted with some caution because Study 1 was conducted separately 
from Studies 2 and 3 (whereas there was random assignment between 
Studies 2 and 3). Nevertheless, we believe that some limited across-study 
comparisons are useful here— given the similarities in the methodologies 
and participant pools that were used for the studies. 
 
 
answered or listed correctly from a given category. For Study 1, 
these easiness scores ranged from 1.97 (SD = 1.34) for baroque 
music to 5.53 (SD = 0.89) for fast food (pretest n = 64). For 
Studies 2 and 3, these easiness scores ranged from 0.69 (SD = 
0.90) for tool brands to 6.80 (SD = 1.76) for planets (pretest n = 
31). Using an idiographic-statistical approach, we then 
computed—separately for each participant—the correlation 
between these easiness scores and his or her likelihood estimates 
about winning across categories. The mean of these within-
subject correlations for standard and debias conditions of 
Studies 1–3 are listed in Table 1. 
The average correlations within the standard conditions (see 
Table 1) were all significantly different from zero ( ps < .001). 
These results indicate that participants in the standard condition 
showed the usual SCEs— expressing greater optimism about 
winning easy rather than hard categories. Not surprisingly, the 
magnitude of the SCE shrank from Study 1 (in which participants 
knew the least about their competitive advantage or 
disadvantage) to Study 3 (in which participants knew the most 
about their competitive advantage or disadvantage), t(112) = 
5.15, p < .001. 
In the debias conditions, the mean correlations were also 
significantly different from zero in all three studies ( ps < 
.001). However, in Studies 1 and 2 (but not Study 3), the mean 
correlations were significantly lower in the debias condition 
than in the standard  condition:  Study  1,  t(54)  = 2.97,  p  < 
.01;  Study  2, 
t(58) = 2.51, p < .05; Study 3, t(56) = 0.10, p = .92. In other 
words, in Studies 1 and 2, the SCEs were reduced but not elimi- 
nated by the debias instructions. In Study 3, the public nature of 
the prologue activity effectively served as a type of debiasing— 
making participants very aware of their competitors’ strengths and 
weaknesses for each category. Hence, the debias instructions had 
no additional debiasing effect. 
Figure 2A—2C provides a visual representation of the SCEs, 
showing how likelihood judgments shifted as a function of cate- 
gory easiness (from the hardest category on the left to the easiest 
on the right) within the standard and debias conditions. Of course, 
because there was exactly one winner within each pair of 
participants for any given category, the normative average 
probability of winning was 50%. Therefore, means above 50% in 
Figure 2A–2C reflect systematic overoptimism, and means 
below 50% reflect systematic overpessimism. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Shared-Circumstance Effect (SCE) by Study and Condition 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
 
  
 
Condition M SD M SD M SD 
Standard .71 .31 .50 .20 .32 .21 
Debias .42 .40 .33 .28 .32 .24 
Note. The SCE values reflect the means of the within-subject correlations 
between general category easiness and a person’s likelihood judgments for 
the categories. Therefore, high means reflect that people’s optimism about 
winning was higher for easy rather than for difficult categories. All of the 
means were significantly greater than zero ( ps < .001). 
Score Estimates and the Possible Influence of Differential 
Regression 
It is instructive to test whether the SCEs on the likelihood 
judgments are simply due to differential regression (see Chambers 
& Windschitl, 2004; Kruger et al., 2008; Moore, 2007; Moore & 
Cain, 2007; Moore & Small, 2007). According to a differential- 
regression account, people would predict low scores and high 
scores for themselves on hard categories and easy categories, 
respectively, but when predicting the scores of other people, all 
estimates would become more regressive because people have less 
knowledge about others. For hard categories, this would produce a 
negative difference between score expectations for the self and 
score expectations for the other (hence low optimism about 
winning), but for easy categories, this would produce a positive 
difference (hence high optimism). 
To test for this possibility, we created self– other difference 
scores for each person by subtracting a participant’s score 
estimates regarding the competitor from his or her score esti- 
mates for the self (for each category). Using the same 
idiographic-statistical approach as described above, we then 
computed the within-subject correlations between these self– 
other difference scores with the category easiness scores (see 
means for resulting correlations in Table 2). The mean 
correlations within the standard conditions were significantly 
different from zero in all three studies ( ps < .01), which lends 
support to the idea that there was some degree of differential 
regression in people’s score estimates. The critical comparison 
is between these correlations in the standard condition and the 
correlations from Table 1. The correlations in the two tables 
would be about the same if differential regression in absolute 
assessments accounted for the SCEs in probability judgments. 
However, the average correlations for the standard conditions in 
Table 2 were significantly and substantially smaller than those 
from Table 1: Study 1, t(27) = 6.56, p < .001; Study 2, t(29) = 
8.41, p < .001; Study 3, t(28) = 4.83, p < .001. Hence, 
although differential regression might account for some portion 
of the SCEs involving likelihood judgments, it does not account 
for the entirety of those effects. In other words, it appears that 
some degree of differential weighting (egocentrism/focalism) 
must be contributing to the magnitude of the SCEs. 
Figure 3A–3C provides a visual representation of these 
effects—showing how the self and other score estimates shifted 
as a function of category easiness. We collapsed across the 
instruction conditions for generating Figure 3A–3C, as the 
instruction manipulation did not significantly impact the effects. 
 
The Accuracy of Likelihood Judgments and the Influence 
of Debias Instructions 
There are many ways of assessing the accuracy or inaccuracy 
of the likelihood judgments in our studies (see e.g., González- 
Vallejo & Bonham, 2007; Yates, 1990, 1994). We focused on 
three methods. First, we assessed whether  participants  were 
well calibrated— contingent on whether the categories were 
generally hard or generally easy. One way of indexing this type 
of accuracy would be to dichotomize the categories into hard 
and easy and then, within each of these two levels, compare the 
mean probability estimates with the overall percentage of wins, 
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Figure 2. A: Mean likelihood estimates as a function of condition and category in Study 1. SA = South 
American. B: Mean likelihood estimates as a function of condition and category in Study 2. C: Mean likelihood 
estimates as a function of condition and category in Study 3. 
 
 
 
which is necessarily 50%. However, to avoid an arbitrary 
dichotomization of hard and easy and to establish a single 
metric of this form of accuracy or inaccuracy (for group-level 
analyses), we can simply refer to the SCE index that was 
described 
earlier (i.e., the correlation between category easiness and 
likelihood judgments). To the extent that participants gave 
lower estimates for their probability of winning hard 
categories and higher estimates for their probability of 
winning easy catego- 
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Table 2 
Correlations Between Self-Other Difference Scores and 
Category Easiness 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Results Involving the Model 
The Treatment of K 
We now turn to analyses involving our version of the EST 
model, but before getting too far, we must address how we treated 
Condition 
 
  
M SD M SD M SD 
K within the model. Formally, K serves as a normalization 
constant (see Idson et al., 2001). Conceptually, K reflects a 
default or 
Standard .24 .50 .25 .20 .14 .24 
Debias .20 .41 .23 .25 .21 .18 
 
 
Note. The values reflect the means of the within-subject correlations 
between general category easiness and a person’s self-other difference 
scores. Therefore, high means reflect that the self-other differences were 
greater for easy rather than difficult categories. All of the means were 
significantly greater than zero ( ps < .01). 
 
 
ries, the SCE index will have a strong positive value.6 Hence, 
even though we are indexing this type of inaccuracy with a 
correlation, it can be considered a form of contingent, mean- 
level inaccuracy because it reflects systematic deviations from 
50%. 
Second, we assessed a form of discrimination or correlational 
accuracy—namely, whether people tended to give higher 
probability estimates to the categories they would win than to the 
categories they would lose. This is related to the slope component 
described by Yates (1990; 1994), but in our work we use a 
correlation as our index (i.e., the correlation between win–loss 
outcomes and likelihood judgments across categories). 
Third, we used the mean probability score or Brier score, which 
is the most common global measure for gauging the accuracy of 
probability judgments (Brier, 1950; Yates, 1990). The Brier score 
includes elements of the other measures of accuracy; it is 
influenced by both mean-level inaccuracy and by correlational 
inaccuracy (i.e., poor discrimination). The Brier score for a 
single judgment is defined as 
Brier score = (f - d)2 
where f is the probability judgment and d is 1 for a win and 0 for 
a loss. Therefore, the overall Brier score ranges from 0 to 1, with 
smaller numbers indicating greater accuracy. 
The results for these three accuracy indexes appear in Table 3. The 
top two rows contain the values for the SCE index and are therefore 
redundant with Table 1. We have already discussed how the debias 
instructions improved people’s judgment accuracy in the sense that 
they showed smaller SCEs (i.e., less of a tendency to be over-
pessimistic about hard categories and/or overoptimistic about easy 
catego- 
general expectation. As discussed earlier, norm theory might pro- 
vide one perspective on what shapes K (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; see also Giladi & Klar, 2002). According to this perspective, 
the K for a given performance would be a norm that is partly 
shaped by performance representations evoked by the features of 
the task and partly shaped by preexisting frames of reference. This 
suggests that K is multiply determined. For example, when a 
person evaluates his or her performance on a baroque music 
category, the general standard (K) could be influenced by elicited 
representations of previous quiz performances (e.g., past 
performances on music quizzes). Simultaneously, K could be 
shaped by very recent performance experiences (the 
performances on the other quiz categories) and, in part, by 
preexisting expectations about what constitutes a general 
standard of good performance (e.g., a performance with 70% 
accuracy might be thought of as mediocre because it typically 
translates into a low C in college courses). 
Because K is presumably shaped in so many ways, the best 
operationalization of K could vary somewhat across empirical 
contexts. We could have allowed K to vary as a free parameter—to 
be estimated separately for each participant in a way that 
maximizes model fit. Instead, however, we assumed that a 
participant’s average self-score prediction across the categories 
would adequately serve as an estimate of K. That is, we assumed 
that self-performances on the other categories would be a highly 
salient context, and therefore, the self-score predictions would 
provide a good approximation of K. Therefore, in the modeling 
described below, the value of K used for a given participant was 
always the mean of his or her self-score predictions across all 
categories. We note that variations in the operationalized 
values of K—within plausible boundaries—would have very 
little impact on the modeling results that we report below 
because in our modeling we were solving for the values of i\ that 
maximized correlations rather than minimized squared 
deviations.7 
Results Regarding Descriptive i\ 
We solved for descriptive values of i\ separately for each 
participant. More specifically, using Equation 3 and a 
participant’s 
ries). Regarding correlational or discrimination accuracy, however,    
Table 3 shows that this type of accuracy did not improve with the 
presence of debias instructions in any of the studies ( ps = .37, .85, 
and .08, for Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Furthermore, the Brier 
score also showed no statistically significant improvement (i.e., re- 
duction) in any of the studies ( ps > .20). A preliminary conclusion 
from this finding would be that the egocentrism that people use in 
making their likelihood judgments (which is partially removed when 
strong debias instructions are encountered) might not have any 
negative ramifications for correlational accuracy and might have 
few ramifications for accuracy as assessed by a standard, global 
accuracy measure such as the Brier score. However, we return to this 
issue later in the article. 
6 We refer readers back to Figures 2A–2C for a depiction of how 
underestimations (mean responses under 50%) and overestimations (mean 
responses above 50%) varied across specific categories. 
7 A higher versus lower value for K would have a mean-level impact on 
the right side of Equation 3 (i.e., s(A)/[s(A)+K]) and therefore on predicted 
probability values. However, our model maximized correlations between 
observed and predicted probability values, and it would therefore be mostly 
insensitive to such mean-level shifts. An implausibly extreme value for K 
(e.g., 0 or 40) would cause the right side of Equation 3 (i.e., s(A)/[s(A)+K]) 
to produce similar results even when s(A) varies, which would influence i\. 
However, as long as K is within a reasonable range (i.e., anywhere near the 
center of the range for s[A] values), slight variations in K do not 
substantially impact the modeling results regarding i\. 
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Figure 3. A: Mean score estimates for self and other by category in Study 1. SA = South American. B: Mean 
score estimates for self and other by category in Study 2. C: Mean score estimates for self and other by category 
in Study 3. 
 
judgment data, we solved for the value of i\ that produced model- 
based likelihood estimates that were maximally correlated with his 
or her actual likelihood judgments. The mean values for 
descriptive i\ are shown in Table 4. Table 4 also displays the 
mean of the within-subject correlations between a participant’s 
likelihood judgments and the model output (using individually 
estimated i\s). We report the means of these correlations rather 
than the means of 
the r2 values in order to preserve (when calculating a mean) the 
impact of instances—although rare—in which a person’s 
judgments and model output were negatively related. 
The pattern of descriptive i\s in Studies 1–3 matched our 
expectations. The mean descriptive i\ increased across Studies 1 
through 3 (a one-way analysis of variance was significant), F(2, 
166) = 7.80, p < .001. This is consistent with the idea that 
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Table 3 
Accuracy Indexes by Study and Condition 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
people’s likelihood judgments from their score estimates for them- 
selves and their competitor. 
 
Results Regarding Prescriptive i\ 
Index and condition 
Mean-level accuracy (SCE) 
M SD M SD M SD When solving for prescriptive values of i\, we again did so 
separately for each participant. More specifically, using the EST 
 
Correlational or 
discrimination accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. For the SCE values, which are the same as those in Table 1, higher 
values reflect less accuracy. The values for correlational or discrimination 
accuracy reflect the means of the within-subject correlations between a 
person’s likelihood judgments and actual win/loss outcomes across cate- 
gories. Therefore, higher values reflect greater accuracy. For the Brier 
score, higher scores reflect less accuracy. SCE = shared circumstance 
effect. 
 
 
egocentrism would be strongest (weakest) when participants knew 
the least (most) about their competitors (see e.g., Kruger et al., 
2008; Windschitl et al., 2003). 
As expected, the descriptive values of i\ were smaller in the 
standard conditions than in the debias conditions for each of the 
three studies: Study 1, t(53) = 3.77, p < .001; Study 2, t(55) = 
5.06, p < .001; and Study 3, t(55) = 2.75, p < .01. This reflects 
that participants who received the debias instructions became less 
egocentric (i.e., they tended to base their probability judgments on 
the comparison between the estimated scores of themselves and 
the estimated score of the other). 
Finally, the correlations for individually fit models were 
generally quite high, with most means falling within the .80 –.90 
range (or a mean r2 range of .64 –.81). This indicates success in 
modeling 
 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive i\ and Resulting Correlations for Individually 
that produced model-based likelihood estimates that were 
maximally correlated with actual outcomes. The mean values for 
prescriptive i\ are shown in Table 5. Table 5 also displays the 
mean of the maximized correlations (i.e., the correlations between 
model output and actual win–loss outcomes). 
Inspection of the i\s in Table 5 yields various observations. Not 
surprisingly, the prescriptive i\s did not differ between standard 
and debias conditions in the three studies: Study 1, t(53) = 1.15, 
p = .26; Study 2, t(54) = 0.79, p = .44; and Study 3, t(55) = 1.54, 
p = .13. We did not expect differences in prescriptive i\s because 
we assumed that the presence or absence of debias instructions 
would not impact how people should weight self- and other- 
assessments (just how they would weight them). 
More interesting is the fact that the mean prescriptive i\s fell 
substantially short of 1.0 within each of the three experiments ( ps 
<.01). This result indicates that egocentric weighting—at least to 
some degree—would be warranted for generating optimal 
predictions about winning from the participants’ self- and other 
score estimates. However, some of this prescribed egocentrism 
might reflect a statistical artifact. Even if the conceptually ideal 
value for i\ was 1.0 for a given study (i.e., no egocentrism), among 
a sample of participants, there are bound to be instances in 
which idiosyncratic or chance factors within some participants’ 
data will lead to prescriptive values of i\ that are different from 
1.0. Given that prescriptive i\s cannot exceed 1.0, all chance-
related deviations from 1.0 would fall in one direction. 
Therefore, the mean of the 
 
Table 5 
Prescriptive i\ and Resulting Correlations for Individually 
Fit Models 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Fit Models Index and Condition M SD M SD M SD 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
 
Prescriptive i\ 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Correlations for individually 
fit models 
Standard .74 .16 .83 .16 .84 .09 
Debias .81 .22 .87 .09 .90 .07 
 
 
Note. Descriptive i\ (ranging from 0 to 1) was estimated separately for 
each participant, such that it maximized the correlation between the 
participant’s likelihood judgments and the model output. It reflects the 
extent to which a participant exhibited egocentrism in making 
likelihood judgments, with high values reflecting low egocentrism. The 
correlations reflect the extent to which the model output (with individually 
fit values of descriptive i\) correlated with participants’ likelihood 
judgments. 
 
Note. Prescriptive i\ (ranging from 0 to 1) was estimated separately for 
each participant, such that it maximized the correlation between the 
participant’s actual outcomes (0 = lose, 1 = win) and the model 
output. It reflects the extent to which a participant should have exhibited 
egocentrism in making likelihood judgments (to maximize accuracy), 
with high values reflecting low egocentrism. The correlations reflect the 
extent to which the model output (with individually fit values of 
prescriptive i\) correlated with a participant’s actual outcomes. 
Conceptually, the correlations reflect how accurate a person’s likelihood 
judgments could have been given an optimal weighting scheme (i\) and 
given his or her estimates of scores for the self and the competitor. 
Standard .71 .31 .50 .20 .32 .21 equation, the score estimates for self and other, and the actual 
Debias .42 .40 .33 .28 .32 .24 outcome values (0 = lose, 1 = win), we solved for the value of i\ 
 
Standard .15 .33 .38 .29 .53 .21 
Debias .06 .34 .35 .27 .43 .23 
Global accuracy (Brier      
score)       
Standard .28 .09 .24 .11 .19 .08 
Debias .26 .06 .22 .07 .21 .07 
 
 Standard .34 .46 .73 .39 .84 .27 
Index and condition M SD M SD M SD Debias .49 .47 .64 .42 .71 .38 
Descriptive i\ 
Standard 
 
.22 
 
.33 
 
.33 
 
.28 
 
.57 
 
.27 
Correlations (for 
predicting outcomes) 
Standard 
 
.29 
 
.32 
 
.45 
 
.23 
 
.58 
 
.16 
Debias .59 .39 .70 .27 .76 .25 Debias .18 .30 .40 .24 .43 .26 
 
 
 
empirically calculated prescriptive i\s may fall below 1.0 for 
statistical reasons rather than conceptually important reasons. As 
an illustration, even when i\s are derived from actual self and other 
scores (predicting wins/loses), the mean of these actual score i\s 
are  below  1.0  (.79,  .83,  and  .86  in  Experiments  1,  2,  and  3, 
Table 6 
Percentages of Participants Exhibiting Too Much, Just the Right 
Amount of or Too Little Egocentrism 
 
 
Condition Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
egocentric weighting of actual self and other scores would opti- 
mize the predictions of wins, but this type of egocentric weighting 
is not conceptually interesting and would not change the fact that 
nonegocentric weighting (i\ 1.0) would be the best global or a 
priori policy for using actual self and other scores to predict wins. 
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why we can conclude that 
the prescriptive i\s from Experiments 1–3 do indeed reflect more 
than a statistical artifact. First, the prescriptive i\s were 
significant 
 
.001, .05, and .05 for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively). A 
statistical-artifact account could not explain these differences. Sec- 
ond, mean prescriptive i\ increased across Studies 1 through 3 (a 
one-way analysis of variance was significant), F(2, 165) = 14.96, 
p < .001. This pattern is consistent with our prediction that 
egocentrism would be less optimal as participants’ knowledge 
about their respective competitors increased. This trend is not 
consistent with a statistical-artifact account. In summary, on the 
basis of trends in descriptive and prescriptive i\s across studies, it 
appears that people were, and should have been, more egocentric 
when they knew little rather than much about their competitor. 
 
Comparisons of Descriptive and Prescriptive i\ 
The analyses reported in the two previous sections established 
that some degree of egocentrism was observed and some degree 
was also prescribed, but we can also examine the issue of whether 
the amount observed was more or less than the amount prescribed. 
For the standard conditions, the prescriptive i\s were significantly 
higher than descriptive i\s in Study 2, t(29) = 5.29, p < .001, and 
in Study 3, t(28) = 4.86, p < .001. The same trend was present but 
not significant for Study 1, t(26) = 1.09, p = .29. These results 
from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that people in the standard conditions 
were generally more egocentric than they should have been to 
maximize correlational accuracy. Within the debias conditions of 
all three studies, prescriptive and descriptive i\s were not 
significantly different ( ps > .30), perhaps reflecting that 
participants (as a group) responded well to the debias 
instructions. 
We also compared prescriptive and descriptive i\s on an 
individual basis to determine whether most participants would 
have benefited (in terms of making more accurate likelihood 
judgments) from exhibiting less egocentrism or more 
egocentrism (see Hoch, 1987, for similar analysis regarding 
false consensus). We classified participants into one of three 
groups depending on whether their descriptive i\ was (a) less 
than their prescriptive i\—suggesting they were overly 
egocentric, (b) the same as their prescriptive i\—which is just 
right, or (c) more than their prescriptive i\—suggesting they were 
less egocentric than they should have been. The resulting 
percentages for these tallies are presented in Table 6. The results 
in Table 6 are consistent with those of the mean-level 
analyses. In the standard conditions of Studies 2 and 3, there were 
more participants who overdid egocentrism than underdid it: for 
Study 2, x2(1, N = 28) = 9.14, p < .01, and for Study 3, x2(1, N = 
27) = 13.37, p < .001. The same trend was present but not 
Descript i \ Prescript. i\ 
(too much egocentrism) 37.0 73.3 79.3 
Descript. i \ Prescript. i\ 
(just right) 37.0 6.7 6.9 
Descript. i \ Prescript. i\ 
(too little egocentrism) 25.9 20.0 13.8 
Debias 
Descript. i \ Prescript. i\ 
(too much egocentrism) 35.7 40.7 39.3 
(just right) 21.4 11.1 21.4 
Descript. i \ Prescript. i\ 
(too little egocentrism) 42.9 48.1 39.3 
 
 
Note. The percentages were based on conditions within a given study. 
For example, 37.0% of participants within the standard condition of Study 
1 exhibited too much egocentrism (i.e., descriptive i\ that was smaller than 
prescriptive i\). Descript. = descriptive; Prescript = prescriptive. 
 
 
significant for Study 1, x2(1, N = 17) = 0.53, p = .47. There were 
no such trends in the debias conditions. In short, participants in the 
standard conditions of Studies 2 and 3, but not those in the debias 
conditions, were overly egocentric. 
 
The Consequences of Egocentrism for Accuracy 
How much did the overegocentrism exhibited by participants in 
the standard conditions hurt their ability to be accurate in their 
likelihood judgments? By using the model, we can simulate the 
impact that various degrees of egocentrism would or did have on 
accuracy. More specifically, we can compare the impact of the 
actually observed egocentrism with the impact of four theoretical 
levels of egocentrism: (a) the prescriptive level of egocentrism as 
established above, (b) no egocentrism, (c) moderate egocentrism, 
and (d) pure egocentrism. We can instantiate these theoretical 
conditions by setting i\ equal to prescriptive i\ for the first set of 
analyses, i\ equal to 1 for the second set, i\ equal to .5 for the third 
set, and i\ equal to 0 for the fourth set. For each participant in the 
standard condition and for each of the simulated levels of i\, we 
calculated the correlation between model output and his or her 
actual outcomes (win or loss) across categories. Table 7 shows the 
means for the resulting correlations. The first row of data reflects 
the extent to which participants’ actual probability judgments 
(with unaltered i\s) predicted actual outcomes. The values in this 
row are the same as values listed for correlational or discrimination 
accuracy in Table 3. The next four rows reflect the results for 
different theoretical instantiations of i\ (with the second row being 
identical to the correlations for the standard condition listed in 
Table 5). Again, the correlations in these four rows reflect the 
extent to which a simulated level of egocentrism yielded likelihood 
judgments (model output) that were accurate. 
There are many possible patterns to examine from Table 7, but 
we guide the reader to the three we find most critical. First, the 
correlations tended to be slightly higher in the second row than in 
the first: Study 1, t(26) = 2.31, p < .05; Study 2, t(29) = 1.83, p = 
 
 
Table 7 
Correlations Reflecting Actual and Possible Accuracy at 
Various Levels of Egocentrism in Standard Conditions of 
Studies 1–3 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
 
  
Accuracy 
 
 
Actual 
When i\ is set at prescribed 
value 
When i\ is set at 1.0 
When i\ is set at 0.5 
When i\ is set at 0.0 
 
 
Note. The values in the first row reflect the extent to which participants’ 
actual probability judgments correlated with actual win/loss outcomes. The 
values in the next four rows reflect the extent to which model output 
(simulating various levels of egocentrism) would correlate with actual 
win/loss outcomes. 
 
 
.08; and Study 3, t(28) = 1.42, p = .17. This indicates that if 
participants had weighted their self- and other-assessments differ- 
ently— using the prescriptive i\ calculated by the model—they 
would have improved their accuracy, but only slightly. Second, the 
correlations in the second row were also slightly higher than those 
in the third row: Study 1, t(26) = 4.12, p < .001; Study 2, t(29) = 
2.57, p < .05; and Study 3, t(28) = 2.06 p = .05. This indicates 
that the weighting specified by prescriptive i\ (which involved 
some egocentrism) would produce slightly more accurate 
judgments than would a weighting scheme in which 
egocentrism was entirely absent. Third, except for Study 1, the 
correlations tended to be higher when i\ was 1 than when it was 
0: Study 1, t(26) = 1.11, p = .28; Study 2, t(29) = 2.95, p < .01; 
and Study 3, t(28) = 
3.79, p < .01. This reflects that people would generally be more 
accurate if they exhibited no egocentrism rather than full 
egocentrism. The reason why Study 1 was an exception to this 
pattern is probably because participants knew very little about 
their actual comparative advantage or disadvantage. When the 
knowledge one holds about a competitor is not insightful about 
one’s comparative advantage then even full use of that knowledge 
would not improve the accuracy of one’s probability judgments. 
To examine a different consequence of egocentrism, we 
computed the SCEs that would result when i\ takes on the same 
theoretical values that were simulated in Table 7. Table 8 shows 
the magnitude of the simulated SCEs for the standard conditions. 
Because SCEs were indexed according to the correlations between 
easiness of a category and optimism about winning that category, 
t(28) = 3.32, p < .01). Third, when i\s were set to their prescribed 
values (i.e., values optimal for achieving correlational accuracy), 
the simulated SCEs were large and significantly different from 
zero (see second row of Table 8; Study 1, t(26) = 7.59, p < .001; 
Study 2, t(29) = 7.86, p < .001; Study 3, t(28) = 5.37 p < .001). 
This is consistent with the notion that optimal weighting of 
information (for correlational accuracy) will yield SCEs. Thus, 
it appears that at least a portion of SCEs can be attributed to a 
sensible degree of egocentrism in the form of differential 
weighting (see e.g., Kruger et al., 2008). Furthermore, we note 
that the size of the simulated SCEs—when i\ was set to the 
prescribed values—was greater in Study 1 than 2 ( p < .05) and 
greater in Study 2 than in 3 ( p < .05). This suggests that as 
people know less about their competitor, the differential 
weighting that optimizes their correlational accuracy will 
necessarily yield larger SCEs. Finally, a comparison of the last 
three rows of the table reveals a clear pattern in which 
simulated SCEs increased as the level of egocentrism increased 
(i.e., as i\ decreased). 
 
Summary of the Key Findings 
We collected data in three competitive environments that ranged 
from one in which participants had very little knowledge about the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of their competitor (Study 
1) to one in which participants had substantially more knowledge 
of their competitor (Study 3). The key findings can be summarized 
as follows. 
1. All three studies produced robust SCEs in both the standard 
and debias conditions. 
2. In Studies 1 and 2, the SCEs in the debias conditions were 
smaller than those in the standard conditions, suggesting that the 
debias instructions were successful in reducing people’s tendency 
to be egocentric when gauging their optimism. Analyses of 
descriptive i\s from our applications of the EST model confirm 
that participants in Studies 1 and 2 were less egocentric in the 
debias condition than the standard condition. For participants in 
Study 3, who were relatively aware of their comparative 
advantage or disadvantage because of the prologue activity, the 
debias manip- 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Actual and Possible Shared-Circumstance Effects (SCEs) at 
Various Levels of Egocentrism in Standard Conditions of 
Studies 1–3 
 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
high values reflect strong simulated SCEs. 
We focus on three mains observations regarding the patterns in 
SCE 
   
M SD M SD M SD 
Table 8. First, we note that if there were absolutely no egocentrism 
(i\ set to 1.0; see third row in Table 8), there would still be 
significant SCEs (Study 1, t(26) = 3.22, p < .01; Study 2, t(29) = 
8.29, p < .001; Study 3, t(28) = 3.24 p < .01). These effects 
would be attributable to differential regression effects discussed 
earlier. Second, however, the SCEs would be significantly smaller 
than those observed from people’s actual probability judgments— 
due to the role of the egocentrism that influenced actual probability 
judgments (compare first and third rows in Table 8; Study 1, 
t(26) = 6.22, p < .001; Study 2, t(29) = 6.84, p < .001; Study 3, 
Actual .71       .31       .50       .20       .32       .21 
When i\ is set at prescribed 
value .62 .37 .43 .26 .28 .28 
When i\ is set at 1.0 .31       .48       .31       .20       .17       .28 
When i\ is set at 0.5 .64       .38       .55       .14       .42       .21 
When i\ is set at 0.0 .79       .26       .69       .12       .62       .18 
 
 
Note. The values in the first row reflect the extent to which participants’ 
actual probability judgments correlated with general category easiness. The 
values in the next four rows reflect the extent to which model output 
(simulating various levels of egocentrism) would correlate with general 
category easiness. 
M SD M SD M SD 
.15 .33 .38 .29 .53 .21 
.29 .32 .45 .23 .58 .16 
.10 .36 .41 .23 .54 .20 
.15 .33 .37 .24 .50 .19 
.18 .39 .28 .27 .38 .24 
 
 
 
ulation had little influence, presumably because the prologue had, 
de facto, already debiased all participants. 
3. Based on coarse, cross-study comparisons, the magnitude of 
the SCEs and degree of egocentrism (highest in Study 1, lowest in 
Study 3) was indirectly related to the amount of knowledge 
participants had about their comparative advantage or 
disadvantage. 
4. Based on prescriptive analyses—which solved for the level of 
i\ that would maximize the correlational accuracy—the highest 
levels of egocentrism were prescribed in Study 1 (in which knowl- 
edge about one’s competitor was low) and the lowest in Study 3 (in 
which knowledge about one’s competitor was higher). 
5. A comparison of descriptive and prescriptive i\s revealed that 
most participants in the standard conditions of Studies 2 and 3 
would have been slightly more accurate in their likelihood 
judgments (in terms of giving likelihood judgments that correlated 
with actual wins or losses) if they had been less egocentric than 
they were. This trend was not significant for Study 1 because 
partici- pants had so little information about their competitor 
that being nonegocentric did not necessarily result in using 
more reliable information. 
6. By using the EST model and plugging in theoretical values 
for i\, we learned more about the consequences of egocentrism. 
Relative to when we simulated the complete absence of egocen- 
trism (i \ 1), the simulation of full egocentrism in standard 
conditions (i\ 0) led to slightly poorer correlational accuracy in 
likelihood judgments (Studies 2 and 3) and substantially poorer 
mean-level accuracy in the form of larger SCEs (Studies 1, 2, and 3). 
7. Finally, although the debias instructions generally reduced 
SCEs (as mentioned in Point 2 above), the debias instructions did 
not prompt greater accuracy in terms of correlations or on the Brier 
score. 
 
General Discussion 
Our work illustrates the benefits of taking an EST approach to 
understanding people’s optimism in competitions. The work also 
reveals a host of information about whether egocentrism helped or 
hurt accuracy and how people respond to debiasing instructions 
regarding egocentrism. We start our General Discussion with an 
examination of these two topics. Then we discuss how EST could 
be fruitfully applied to other judgments, such as comparative 
ability or trait judgments. We also discuss the relationship between 
EST and other accounts of comparative bias, and before conclud- 
ing, we explain the benefits of using EST over conventional 
methods of assessing egocentrism in comparative judgments. 
 
Is Egocentrism a Good Thing? Are People Excessive or 
Judicious in Their Egocentrism? 
The verdict on whether egocentrism was a good thing in these 
studies is complex and depends on what type of accuracy serves as 
the gold standard. Regarding mean-level accuracy as indexed by 
the SCE, egocentrism was always bad. The SCEs simulated by the 
model were smallest when egocentrism was completely absent 
rather than partially or fully present (see bottom three rows of 
Table 8). Also, the SCEs that were actually observed would have 
been smaller if no egocentrism were present (compare Rows 1 and 
3 of Table 8). Regarding correlational accuracy, the short answer 
as to whether egocentrism is a good thing is as follows: small 
levels of egocentrism can be good, but people tend to overdo 
egocentrism (in the standard conditions). The prescriptive i\s 
tended to prescribe some degree of egocentrism, and models 
involving prescriptive i\s produced slightly more accurate judg- 
ments than did models simulating no egocentrism (compare Rows 
2 and 3 of Table 7). Yet, for most participants in the standard 
conditions of Studies 2 and 3, the accuracy of their likelihood 
judgments would have been better if they were less rather than 
more egocentric. The extent to which they overdid egocentrism, 
however, caused only mild damage to the correlation accuracy. To 
summarize, egocentrism at any degree is bad for mean-level ac- 
curacy, and although egocentrism has potential to help 
correlational accuracy, the degree of egocentrism that people tend 
to show outpaces the level that would be optimal for correlation 
accuracy. Overall— considering both mean-level and 
correlational accura- cy—it appears that people in competitions 
like these would be wise to be less egocentric than they are 
normally inclined to be. 
Although we have just noted that our participants were generally 
excessive in their egocentrism, we also note that there were signs 
of judiciousness. Most notably, our prescriptive analyses 
suggested that participants in Study 3 should be the least 
egocentric, whereas those in Study 1 should be the most 
egocentric. Indeed, the analyses of descriptive i\s revealed that 
this was the observed pattern across Studies 1–3. 
Our findings regarding egocentrism constitute an important ex- 
tension beyond recent articles that have noted the possibility of a 
rational grounding for some egocentrism or differential weighting 
(see Burson & Klayman, 2006; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; 
Kruger et al., 2008; see also Moore & Small, 2007). As discussed 
earlier, these articles suggest that because people tend to have 
more knowledge about themselves than about others, any assess- 
ments they make of themselves would tend to be more valid than 
assessments they make of others; therefore, people might have 
good reason for giving more weight to assessments about the self 
than to assessments about another. Of these articles, only one study 
from Burson and Klayman (2006), which is discussed below, 
empirically assessed what the optimal weighting of self and other- 
assessments would be. Therefore, the current article is notable in 
being one of the first to test whether egocentrism is, in fact, a good 
thing. Whereas previous articles speculated that egocentrism might 
be beneficial for correlational accuracy (and perhaps a composite 
form of overall accuracy), our results provide more detailed and 
empirically backed conclusions. Namely, egocentrism is indeed 
potentially useful for maximizing correlational accuracy, but the 
level of egocentrism that people tend to exhibit is too extreme. 
This conclusion can be compared with the conclusion that 
Burson and Klayman (2006) drew from their experiment—an 
experiment that was quite different from our own. Participants 
engaged in word prospector tasks, and the main dependent variable 
was a percentile judgment of how one’s performance compared 
with the performance of all other students rather than a likelihood 
judgment about beating a single competitor. Burson and Klayman 
manipulated whether people received direct feedback about their 
own performance and the median performance of others. On the 
basis of regression analyses, which treated actual percentile as the 
criterion variable, they concluded that their participants’ relative 
weighting of self-assessments and other-assessments should have 
been sensitive— but were not sensitive—to the feedback 
manipulations, which suggests that people are insensitive to the 
diagnos- 
 
 
ticity of self- and other-assessments. This conclusion is at odds 
with our finding that as people knew more about their competitor 
(more in Experiment 3 than in 2 than in 1), they were less 
egocentric.8 However, because there are so many distinctions 
between the methodologies of our studies and that of the study by 
Burson and Klayman, we do not attempt to discuss all the possible 
reasons for the different conclusions. Clearly, this would be a good 
area for further research. 
Our conclusions can also be compared with the conclusions 
drawn by researchers looking at a somewhat parallel issue from the 
false consensus literature (Davis et al., 1986; Dawes & Mulford, 
1996; Hoch, 1987, 1988; Krueger & Clement, 1994; Krueger & 
Zeiger, 1993). Generally, a false consensus effect is said to occur 
when people overestimate the extent to which their own 
characteristics, attitudes, or behaviors are shared by others 
(Marks & Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985). A particular false 
consensus effect might be manifested as follows: Relative to 
participants who do not endorse a particular attitude, those 
who do endorse the attitude give higher estimates of the 
general prevalence of that attitude (e.g., Ross et al., 1977). 
Davis, Hoch, Dawes, and their respective coauthors (Davis et 
al., 1986; Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Hoch, 1987, 1988) argued 
that although the false consensus effect might appear to suggest 
faulty reasoning or beliefs on the part of respondents, the effect 
is actually the result of a sensible projection. From a Bayesian 
perspective, the self provides a useful data point for estimating a 
population statistic (see Dawes & Mulford, 1996). A related 
point is that when people have good information about the self 
and only sketchy or unreliable information about others, using 
the self as an anchor for projecting about others might be a sensible 
strategy if there is some actual similarity between the self and the 
target being estimated (Hoch, 1987). Hoch (1987) used a modeling 
and data analysis strategy that has parallels with ours, such as 
the computation of a variable reflecting the weight that self-
characteristics should receive relative to other information. 
Using this approach, he demonstrated that projection could be 
useful and was generally not overused for optimizing accuracy in 
people’s estimates about others (but for an alternative perspective, 
see Krueger & Clement, 1994; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). Although 
Hoch’s (1987) conclusions might seem to be at odds with the 
conclusions we generated from our experiments, there is no real 
conflict. The false consensus research of Hoch (1987) and others 
focused on how projection influences the accuracy of people’s 
estimates about others, whereas our work focuses on how 
egocentrism influences the accuracy of likelihood judgments 
about com- petition outcomes. 
 
The Influence of Debias Instructions 
As already reported, the debias instructions had mixed 
influences on accuracy. Generally speaking, they led to greater 
mean- level accuracy (i.e., smaller SCEs in Studies 1 and 2), even 
though they had little influence on correlational accuracy. What 
accounts for this apparent inconsistency? We suggest that when 
people are strenuously urged to avoid egocentrism (as we did in 
our debias conditions), people are quite capable of shifting 
additional atten- tion and weight to their competitor’s strengths 
and weaknesses. Indeed, the descriptive i\ values from Studies 1 
and 2 reflect less egocentrism in the debias conditions. This 
reduction in egocentrism—as any reduction in egocentrism 
would be—was successful 
in reducing the magnitude of SCEs. However, this attentional shift, 
we suspect, was rather crude. Akin to throwing the baby out with 
the bath water, participants’ shifts of attention may have offset 
egocentrism that was not rationally grounded (e.g., a chronic 
attentional bias) as well as egocentrism that was rationally 
grounded (i.e., a tendency to weight reliable assessments more 
heavily than less reliable assessments). The result was that people 
were no more accurate, in a correlational sense, with debiasing 
than without. Being more accurate in a correlational sense would 
require that people not only react to the debias instruction but also 
react in a way that preserved any helpful bias yet removed any 
unhelpful bias. This is generally a large hurdle for debiasing 
attempts (see e.g., Larrick, 2004; Wegener & Petty, 1997; see also 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
 
EST as an Integrative Framework 
Thus far, we have discussed and shown how our application of 
EST can be quite useful for conceptualizing, measuring, and 
simulating the effects of egocentrism on optimism in competitions. 
However, EST has broad potential and can be applied to under- 
standing bias in many types of referent-dependent judgments (i.e., 
judgments that require evidence for a target to be compared with 
evidence for a specific referent or set of referents; see Windschitl 
et al., 2008). These referent-dependent judgments include 
comparative ability and trait judgments (e.g., Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & 
Vredenburg, 1995; Dun- ning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; 
Goethals, Messick, & Alli- son, 1991; Hoorens, 1995; Kruger, 
1999; Pahl & Eiser, 2005), comparative optimism judgments 
(e.g., Blanton et al., 2001; Burger & Burns, 1988; Chambers et 
al., 2003; Eiser et al., 2001; Heine & Lehman, 1995; Helweg-
Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996; Klein 
& Weinstein, 1997; Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006; 
Rose, Endo, Windschitl, & Suls, in press; Weinstein, 1980, 
1984), and generic direct-comparison judgments (e.g., Giladi & 
Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Posavac, Brakus, Jain, & Cronley, 2006; 
Suls, Krizan, Chambers, & Mortensen, 2007; Windschitl et al., 
2008). 
The application of EST to comparative ability judgments (e.g., 
“Relative to the average person, how good am I at dancing?”) is 
straightforward and differs little from how we applied EST to 
likelihood judgments about winning. The output of the model 
would merely need an additional transformation, if desired, so that 
answers fall  on  a  smaller  range  (e.g.,  -3 to  +3)  rather  than 
0 –100%. 
In  applying  EST  to  comparative  optimism  judgments  (e.g., 
“Relative  to  other  people,  how  likely  are  you  to  acquire  skin 
cancer?”),  s(A)  and  s(B)  would  reflect  the  subjective  absolute 
likelihoods of the self and others experiencing the specified event. 
K would be the default subjective likelihood for events in general. 
If the event in question is one that is generally frequent or likely, 
 
 
8 The findings from Burson and Klayman (2006) that are most relevant 
to our work involve the cell in their design in which participants received 
no direct feedback. However, the results from this cell are difficult to 
interpret, perhaps in part because participants in that cell did not have a 
very good sense of their relative standing (much like our Experiment 1). 
This lack of knowledge caused the optimal weights for the predictors in 
Burson and Klayman’s regression analysis to be close to zero. 
 
 
then s(A) would tend to be greater than K, and egocentric 
respondents would tend to indicate that they are more likely than 
others to experience the event (which would represent 
comparative optimism or pessimism depending on whether the 
event is positive or negative in valance; see Chambers et al., 
2003; Kruger & Burrus, 2004). 
In applying EST to generic direct-comparison judgments 
(“Relative to the other hotels in the set, how desirable is this 
hotel?”), s(A) and s(B) would reflect the absolute assessments 
regarding the focal and referent items. K would be a default or 
general expectancy for the types of items being considered. EST 
would predict that individual focal items drawn from an 
attractive or otherwise superior set of items would tend to be rated 
as comparatively better than the other items in the set because 
s(A) would be greater than 
K. Focal items from an inferior set would be rated as 
comparatively worse because s(A) < K (see e.g., Giladi & Klar, 
2002; Suls et al., 2007; Windschitl et al., 2008). 
The fact that EST can be applied to a wide range of referent- 
dependent judgments is important. Until very recently, there has 
been relatively little contact between the research literature 
concerning basic probability judgments and the research 
literature concerning  comparative-ability,  comparative-
optimism,  and generic-comparative judgments. This is 
unfortunate given that all of these types of judgments are 
referent-dependent and therefore appear to have some structural 
similarities (yet also differences). We make no claim that EST 
is the only way to model the structural  similarities  shared  by  
referent-dependent  judgments. However, we do believe that EST 
is an excellent place to start. As the name reflects, EST is an 
extension of support theory (Tversky 
& Koehler, 1994), whose notion of subadditivity is useful for 
explaining some very basic and robust characteristics of 
probability judgments. We did not delve into issues regarding 
subadditivity here; subadditivity becomes relevant when there is 
more than one alternative to a focal hypothesis or event. 
However, support theory—and therefore EST—provides a 
formalized and already tested foundation for future research that 
might involve explicitly investigating situations relevant to 
subadditivity (i.e., assessing evidence for multiple rather than 
single alternatives to a focal hypothesis). 
Another related conceptualization that could be used as a global 
framework for referent-dependent judgments is the local standard 
and general standard (LOGE; Giladi & Klar, 2002) concept. In 
their LOGE conceptualization, Giladi and Klar (2002) 
hypothesized that when people are asked to make direct 
comparison judgments, they should compare the focal item (or 
person) exclusively with a local standard—namely the referent 
items specified by the question. However, in part, people 
compare the focal item with a general standard, such as one 
based on all items of its type in memory. Thus, LOGE and EST 
are broadly similar, with the notion of a general standard in 
LOGE being almost the same as K in EST. However, LOGE was 
not articulated as a formalized model. As such, it is not readily 
equipped to handle probability judgments and subadditivity, nor 
does it have a convenient way of quantifying the specific weight 
given to local and general standards. EST is articulated as a 
specific mathematical equation and contains the i\ weighting 
factor. Therefore, between EST and LOGE, which again share 
core features, we find EST to be more useful  for  examining  
specific  results  from  referent-dependent 
judgments  and  for  conceptually  integrating  various  forms  of 
referent-dependent judgments. 
 
Does EST Replace Egocentrism and Other Differential 
Weighting Accounts? 
Our application of EST constitutes an improvement for re- 
searchers’ conceptualization of how biases such as egocentrism 
can result in SCEs, above- and below-average effects, and other 
effects. However, EST in no way replaces or supersedes those 
accounts. This is true for two related reasons. First, EST is not 
intended as a literal process account. When analyses on a study’s 
dataset suggest that i\ was less than 1.0, there are several cognitive 
process explanations for this result. The explanation that seems 
most tied to the EST equation is that i\ is less than 1.0 because 
respondents first made separate absolute judgments about the self 
and their competitor, but when generating their likelihood judg- 
ment they partially compared their absolute judgment of the self 
with a general standard. A related but different explanation would 
suggest that people first thought about whether the task was 
something that they themselves were good at, developing an initial 
sense of optimism or pessimism, then adjusted this optimism— but 
insufficiently— based on thoughts about whether the task was 
something that the competitor would be good at (see the anchoring 
explanation by Kruger, 1999). Yet another possibility is that 
people strategically gave more weight to evaluations in which 
they had more confidence rather than less confidence. These 
accounts (and others; see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004) involve 
different processes, but all can be represented by the model 
because the key factor in each is the extent to which people’s 
likelihood judgments are influenced by assessments regarding 
their competitor. 
A second and related reason for why EST does not replace 
specific egocentrism and related accounts is that the EST model is 
agnostic about the elements of the judgment context that are the 
preconditions for differential weighting (see Windschitl et al., 
2008). That is, the structure of the model would be identical for 
representing the differential weighting that is due to generic 
focalism (i.e., the fact that one entity was denoted as focal in 
the question that solicited a response), some form of egocentrism 
(i.e., the fact that the question asked about the self), or some 
difficulty in assessing support for a group of competitors (i.e., 
the fact that respondent faced more than one competitor). 
Consequently, instead of being viewed as a replacement for any 
account of differential weighting, it should be viewed as a useful 
formalization of the impact that knowledge about a focal entity and 
a referent has on a referent-dependent judgment. This 
formalization, in contrast to verbal accounts, allows for a 
quantification of differential weighting that is relatively 
interpretable and precise. It also is amenable to both descriptive 
and prescriptive analyses. 
 
EST and the Regression (Path Analysis) Approach to 
Assessing Differential Weighting 
Another advantage of the EST approach is that it avoids 
problems that often plague the conventional path analysis 
approach, which has been reported in numerous recent articles 
(e.g., Cham- bers & Suls, 2007; Chambers et al., 2003; Eiser et al., 
2001; Giladi 
& Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997, 1999; Kruger, 
1999; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Kruger et al., 2008; Moore & Kim, 
 
 
2003; Windschitl et al., 2003). In a typical application of the 
path analysis, researchers conduct regression analyses in which 
absolute judgments of the self and the other (e.g., the average 
peer, a friend, a competitor) are entered as predictor variables, 
whereas comparative or likelihood judgments serve as the 
criterion variable. A common finding that is often interpreted 
as support for differential weighting is that the beta weight for 
self is positive and strong, whereas the beta weight for other is 
near zero.9 
One problem that sometimes plagues the interpretation of these 
function of the predictive validity of the overall model (although it 
will become less stable as noise in comparative judgments in- 
creases). 
We wish to emphasize that although there are problems that can 
plague the conventional path analysis approach (as described here 
and elsewhere; see Moore, 2007), these problems do not affect all 
such analyses (see Rose & Windschitl, 2008, for discussion). For 
example, when the referent is one person rather than a group, the 
variability in the self is not always greater than in the other (e.g., 
Windschitl et al., 2003). Also, although we have suggested that 
path analyses is relevant to cases in which the variability across 
evaluations  of  the  other  is  smaller  than  the  variability  across interpretations  of  differential  weighting  based  on  13 
 
SELF and 
evaluations of the self. In such cases, the beta for the self can be 
larger than the beta for the other, even when both self and other are 
equally considered when people formulate a comparative or 
likelihood judgment. The problem is not that path or regression 
analyses tend to reward higher betas to predictors with more 
variability. In fact, regressions have the useful property of 
controlling for the differential variability. Instead, the problem is 
related to what happens when people formulate their 
comparative judgment. If they make a comparison between the 
self and the other—whether it be a difference comparison (self 
– other), a ratio comparison (self / other), or a proportion 
comparison [self / (self + other)]— they are fully considering 
both the self and the other. There is no differential weighting. 
However, across participants or across items, the variability in 
the numeric results of these comparisons will necessarily be 
driven more by the variable with high variability (self) than the 
one with low variability (other). Hence, even if we ran a 
regression with the numeric results of these comparisons as the 
criterion (say self – other), the beta for the self would be larger 
than the beta for the other. Therefore, in short, in cases in which 
the beta for the self is greater than the beta for the other, but the 
variability in the self is also greater than the variability in the 
other, it is then premature to conclude that there was differential 
weighting. 
Our use of EST does not suffer from this problem because, in 
using the EST model, we are testing the extent to which a given 
judgment model is a good one for representing the comparative 
judgment. If a comparison between the self and the other was 
critical in shaping people’s comparative judgments, this would be 
reflected in a strong weight (high i\) for the respective component 
of the model [self / (self + other)], regardless of whether the self 
contained more variability than the other. 
A related point is that on a practical level, the value of i\ 
provides a clearer and more useful way of measuring differential 
weighting than does a comparison of the beta weights from a 
regression involving the self and the other. The value of i\ ranges 
from 0 to 1.0 and can serve as a unitary index of differential 
weighting. Alternatively, in the conventional path analysis 
approach, betas come in pairs and do not have known ranges. 
The researcher must compare the 13SELF with the 13OTHER to infer 
something about the relative contribution of the self and the other. 
But this comparison is not always easily interpreted, such as when 
a 13OTHER is on the positive side of zero, even though it presumably 
should be on the negative side. Complicating matters further is the 
fact that 13SELF and 13OTHER can be systematically influenced by 
the predictive validity of the overall model (e.g., by the level of 
noise in comparative judgments). Alternatively, i\ is isolated as a 
weighting  parameter  whose  value  does  not  rise  and  fall  as  a 
13OTHER  comparisons can be rather challenging, they have never- 
The less been quite useful in detecting coarse differences or 
changes in differential weighting across studies or conditions 
(e.g., see Eiser et al., 2001; Giladi & Klar, 2002; Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007; Kruger et al., 2008). Finally, it is notable that in 
large measure, a conventional, path-analytic approach to our data, 
which we do not report here, suggested similar conclusions about 
differential weighting and its changes across experiments, as 
did our EST approach. In short, conventional path analyses can 
be useful under the right conditions, but the EST approach offers 
improvements in terms of interpretability and precision. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, EST can serve as a useful tool for understanding 
a variety of types of referent-dependent judgments. In the present 
work, EST was specifically used to explore the impact of 
egocentrism on the accuracy of people’s optimism. We found 
that al- though egocentric weighting of information does have 
some conceivable benefits (for correlational accuracy), people 
tended to overdo egocentric weighting. When urged to avoid it, 
they reduced the egocentrism that was implicit in their reported 
optimism. This improved their mean-level accuracy (reduced 
SCEs) but had no net impact on their correlational accuracy. At a 
practical level, then, there appears to be no downside to urging 
people to avoid being egocentric. By extension, these results 
suggest that the high levels of egocentrism that people exhibit 
in social-comparative ability judgments (e.g., Kruger, 1999) and 
comparative optimism judgments (Chambers et al., 2003; Kruger 
& Burrus, 2004; Weinstein 
& Lachendro, 1982) hurt rather than help the overall accuracy of 
those judgments. With that said, however, we recognize that we 
cannot rule out the possibility that egocentrism’s benefits outweigh 
its liabilities within some—as yet unidentified— contexts. For 
future work exploring such contexts, EST and the analytic 
strategies described here offer a useful framework. 
 
 
 
 
9 Other researchers have recently noted caveats that could apply to some 
studies using the path analysis approach. For example, if there is any form 
of conflation of the absolute self-judgments and comparative judgments, or 
if self-judgments can be based on comparative evaluations, then the beta 
for self will necessarily be high (see Burson & Klayman, 2006; Moore & 
Cain, 2007; Moore & Small, 2007). We note that neither of these issues 
applies to our study because the absolute questions were quite concrete and 
were answered on numeric, common-rule scales. 
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